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THE ORDEAL AND PROMISE OF INTEGRATION

9.1 The Ordeal of Integration Revisited

I have argued that integration is an indispensable goal in a society characterized by categorical inequality. It is necessary to block and dismantle the mechanisms that perpetuate unjust social inequality, and to realize the promise of a democratic state that is equally responsive and accountable to citizens of all identities. Yet integration does not proceed without cost. The experience of integration is often stressful and causes the loss or alteration of cherished racially homogeneous institutions. These costs have led both conservatives and various advocates on the left—multiculturalists and black nationalists—to reject integration as a goal of social policy.

The difficulties with the experience of integration must be acknowledged and confronted. “Color-blind” conservatives and advocates of racial identity politics are right to point out these problems. But they lack an adequate analysis of the material and social conditions of racial justice. So they cannot point the way forward. In making the case for racial integration, I also aim to reinforce the central methodological theme of this book: social and political philosophy needs to be grounded in an empirically adequate understanding of the problems we face and the effects of proposed solutions to these problems.

The integration of long segregated groups carries psychological costs. Conservatives point to high levels of racial conflict and self-segregation on more racially diverse campuses. Students at colleges with higher black enrollments report lower satisfaction with their educational experience. They also more often complain that they have experienced discrimination.¹ Conservatives therefore argue that “socially engineered” integration is self-defeating, in that it arouses racial discord and resentment.²

The experience of integration is particularly stressful for blacks. One influential study of black college students, summarizing its own findings in conjunction with prior studies, concludes that black students at majority-white colleges “emphasize feelings of alienation, sensed hostility, racial discrimination, and lack of integration.”³ This contrasts with

their experiences at historically black colleges, where they feel accepted, encouraged, and supported, and report higher grades, occupational aspirations, and social involvement than their peers at majority-white colleges.⁴ Black middle-class adults who work in majority-white firms also perceive discrimination.⁵ Stress is particularly high among blacks who are “tokens” in their organization.⁶

Even more disturbing are reports of crime tied to integration. Many blacks living in white neighborhoods—not just new entrants but long-standing residents—experience violence and harassment at the hands of whites who aim to force them out.⁷ On the other side, some have suggested that class-based integrative housing projects such as MTO have led to increased suburban crime, as former ghetto residents bring criminal habits with them.⁸ If crime levels are tied to “tipping points” of concentrated poverty, and class integration programs increase the number of neighborhoods with moderate poverty concentration above the tipping point, then these integrative programs can end up increasing crime rates overall.⁹

To evaluate these claims, we must sort out the effects of integrative programs from other factors associated with integrated settings. The study by Rothman and colleagues finding higher dissatisfaction in more racially diverse schools has no implications for race-based affirmative action programs. This is because 80 percent of undergraduates attend institutions that accept all minimally qualified applicants, and hence do not practice affirmative action. Only the most selective institutions need affirmative action to achieve a racially integrated class—and these elite schools typically have *less* racial diversity than nonselective schools.¹⁰ The race-neutral outcomes that Rothman and colleagues attribute to racial diversity, such as lower student satisfaction, perceptions of the quality of education, and perceptions of student work ethic, are more plausibly due to the lower academic preparation of the pool from which the school drew its students.

Similarly, the claim that integrative housing programs threaten (implicitly white) suburbs by bringing criminals into their midst is based on the unproven assumption that those committing crimes in areas of increasing crime rates are the beneficiaries of class-integrative programs. This ignores two important facts: that the vast majority of poor people entering suburban neighborhoods with increasing crime rates are not recipients of housing vouchers, and that the neighborhoods they are able to enter already tend to be in economic decline due to independent factors, such as housing foreclosures. Economically distressed neighborhoods typically experience higher crime rates even in the absence of new entrants.¹¹

Such considerations cannot explain away the real race-specific costs of integration—experiences of increased racial conflict, discrimination, and alienation. Orlando Patterson refers to these costs as “the ordeal

of integration.”¹² They include not just experiences of interracial conflict, but discordant interpretations of the quality of race relations. Where whites tend to believe that antiblack discrimination has largely ended, blacks continue to perceive discrimination—a phenomenon whites chalk up to black “hypersensitivity.” Patterson explains these costs as an inevitable consequence of integration. Segregation entails that blacks rarely interact with whites. They have few occasions to experience hostile or discriminatory treatment in face-to-face interaction. Integration exposes blacks to more whites—including more overtly racist whites. Even if the number of overtly racist whites has declined over time, integration increases the chance that blacks will encounter them. Thus, integration increases blacks’ experience of white hostility, even while whites perceive that racism has declined within their group.

Patterson’s analysis can be refined in light of recent research on the nature of racial attitudes. People often hold unconscious ideas that they do not endorse, but which are practically engaged (§3.1). Hence, whites who insult blacks out of racially stigmatizing ideas need not be overt racists; they may be genuinely unaware of what they are doing. Since introspection does not reveal their motive, such whites may unfairly accuse perceptive blacks of hypersensitivity. Overuse of the term “racist,” which implies a stronger condemnation than warranted in the case of unconsciously stigmatizing acts, only reinforces white indignation and resistance to the possibility that their conduct, even if not evil, is racially unjust.

Add to this mix discordant ideas about what nonracist conduct looks like. Many whites worry that even *noticing* a person’s race in interracial contexts may be perceived by blacks as racist; hence they pretend not to notice race even when faced with tasks where doing so can improve group performance. Blacks perceive such “color blindness” as disingenuous and absurd. Moreover, whites who strategically adopt a color-blind stance manifest discomfort with blacks in other ways—they avoid eye contact and appear less friendly.¹³ This is a case of anxious racial discrimination, prompted by stereotype threat (white fear of confirming the stereotype of white racism) (§3.5). While such conduct is not racist, it is racially stigmatizing; it treats blacks as alien. Blacks naturally respond with feelings of alienation in settings with racially anxious whites.

Far from disconfirming the integrationist theory advanced in this book, these costs of integration are *predictions* of the theory. Segregation causes stigmatization. Integration does not instantly undo this effect. When people used to segregation meet in integrated settings, their interactions will predictably engage racially stigmatizing ideas, manifested in various forms of discrimination and unhappy interaction. The issue, then, is not whether racial conflict increases in more integrated settings. It is rather

whether integration, over time, enables people to learn better ways of interacting across racial lines.

This is testable. If the conservative argument is right, then racial conflict would drive out positive experiences of interracial interaction, and people's tendencies to self-segregate would be stable or increase over time in response to the costs of integration. If the integrationist argument is right, then integration in settings of institutionalized support for cooperation initially increases both negative *and positive* interracial interaction. Over time, people will learn to better manage interracial relationships. Increased competence in interracial interaction will increase the returns to such interaction, and thereby induce people to choose more integrated lives. Studies consistently confirm the integrationist hypothesis. Students who attend more racially integrated schools lead more racially integrated lives after graduation: they have more racially diverse coworkers, neighbors, and friends than do students who attend less diverse schools (§6.2, §6.3).

9.2 The Limits of Multiculturalism

That integration in a world pervaded by segregation and stigmatization carries psychic costs, especially for the stigmatized, has important implications for integrationist ideals and policy. Given these costs, members of stigmatized groups need places of refuge, social settings in which they can count on unquestioned acceptance and affirmation, share their experiences with integration among themselves, and generate strategies for coping with the stresses of integration. The ideal of integration should therefore not be construed as to rule out or disparage the importance of preferential in-group affiliation among the disadvantaged at various times and in various settings. As Glenn Loury puts the point: "effective resistance to racial domination requires that the black victims of that domination organize and motivate themselves to collective action through the systematic practice of pro-black discrimination in contact."¹⁴ What integration does rule out is pervasive self-segregation. It is one thing to associate ethnocentrically; quite another for black students "to confine their personal and extracurricular experiences almost exclusively" to same-race organizations and informal groups.¹⁵ Such self-segregation deprives blacks of opportunities for enriching their social and cultural capital, deprives nonblack students of the experiences they need to overcome anti-black racial bias, and deprives us all of the joint perspective-taking we need to realize our culture as a democratic one.

Integration is not the same as assimilation (§6.1). The ideal of integration does not call for the elimination of group difference or group

identity, nor for sweeping prohibitions on ethnocentric affiliation (§1.5), nor for the elimination of institutions in which stigmatized groups constitute a majority. In a just society, the fate of such identities and affiliations can be left to the free choice of equals (§8.6). Integration does call for full participation of members of salient social groups on terms of equality, cooperation, and mutual respect in all domains of civil society. This entails a rejection of strong forms of black nationalist separatism. It requires the construction of a superordinate group identity, a “we,” from the perspective of which cooperative goals are framed, and appropriate policies selected and implemented. In a democratic society, this “we” is most importantly a shared identity as citizens.

Many on the multiculturalist left recoil from the idea of affirming national identities. They give racial identities priority over national identities. Can such ethnocentric identification priorities hope to realize a just society? Consider three prominent multiculturalist accounts of how this is supposed to work, which I shall call the identity development, benign ethnocentrism, and epistemological models.

Beverly Tatum, a leading theorist of the identity development model of ethnocentric affiliation, argues that self-segregation is needed for individuals to develop psychologically healthy and mature racial identities. Black self-segregation emerges among children as a way to cope with racism and negative images of blacks. Blacks turn to one another for a sympathetic ear in discussing encounters with whites, to forge more positive black identities than those prevalent in mainstream culture, and to share their experiences of interpersonal racism and learn how to deal with it.¹⁶ The need not just to cope with racism but to belong to communities in which one is welcomed and affirmed persists through adulthood and justifies blacks’ choices to live in self-segregated communities.

Iris Young advances a benign ethnocentric model of self-segregation. In this model, a social subgroup can legitimately prefer affiliating with “their own,” without implying out-group prejudice. Residential clustering by race is morally permissible “when its purpose is mutual aid and culture-building among those who have affinity with one another, as long as the process of clustering does not exclude some people from access to benefits and opportunities. Such a clustering desire based on lifestyles or comfort is not wrong even when acted on by privileged or formerly privileged groups . . . if it can be distinguished from the involuntary exclusion of others and the preservation of privilege.”¹⁷ She argues that even white Afrikaners in postapartheid South Africa are entitled to their “own” neighborhoods to preserve their language, culture, and sense of history, provided they participate cooperatively in democratic politics.

Integration, Young argues, focuses on the wrong issues. The mere fact that neighborhoods are racially identifiable is no cause for concern. What

matters is the equal allocation of benefits to different areas, not the equal allocation of racial groups to different areas. Her ideal of “differentiated solidarity,” which accommodates benign ethnocentrism, claims to achieve this by moving benefits to the people. She complains that integration, in calling instead for people to move to the resources, forces disadvantaged groups, rather than advantaged ones, to change. Echoing conservative critiques, Young also argues that efforts to promote integration meet with resistance and failure. Finally, integration denies the validity of freedom of association. Differentiated solidarity upholds the rights of groups to choose with whom they will associate.¹⁸

Aimee MacDonald defends an epistemological model of self-segregation in the course of defending racial program houses on college campuses. Racial self-segregation provides a locus for generating knowledge from racially distinctive perspectives, which is needed to counter racism. Because race defines people’s social locations, their opportunities, and the ways people perceive and treat them, people experience the social world differently by virtue of the ways they are racially classified. Arriving at an understanding of how this is so requires people to come to grips with their racial identities, which requires that people of the same race interpret their shared experiences together as a basis for antiracist action.

The analysis of racial oppression and the formation of strategies for achieving political justice are contingent on communities of meaning that are racially identified. Thus anyone concerned with the long-range goal of securing broad-based freedom and autonomy should be committed to the continued existence of racially defined communities on the grounds that differentiated racial identities provide people with different experience of the world. If we are to have a hope of effectively interpreting the world, we need to draw on all epistemic resources. The preservation of racially defined communities of meaning secures the continued diversity of interpretations of the social world, thereby providing a richer array of knowledges from which to construct social, political, aesthetic, spiritual, and scientific accounts of our experience.¹⁹

Tatum, MacDonald, and Young offer powerful accounts of the benefits of self-segregation. I have just endorsed Tatum’s account of these benefits and earlier argued that in racially segregated societies, racial diversity provides critical epistemic resources for democracy (§5.2). Young’s idealized case of benign ethnocentrism abstracts from the fact that ethnocentrism today is inextricable from categorical inequality and stigmatization. Yet I allow that we can imagine just worlds in which ethnocentric affiliation is benign (§8.6). My complaint is not with these models’ accounts of the benefits of self-segregation, but with the priority they give to ethnocentric self-segregation over integration on the basis of a common superordinate

identity. None of these models is grounded in a realistic appraisal of the material and social conditions for advancing racial equality. For blacks to achieve racial equality, blacks need to change, whites need to change, and we need to change. These changes can happen only through racial integration. Let us recall why.

Young imagines a world in which racial equality can be achieved by moving resources to the people, rather than moving people to resources. Such a strategy could work if disadvantaged racial groups lacked only material resources. Yet black disadvantage is caused not simply by lack of material resources but by lack of social and cultural capital, which can be acquired only through interracial interaction (§2.3). Blacks need experience in integrated settings to acquire the skills needed to manage and lead racially integrated, majority-white institutions. This is a matter of acquiring cultural capital, not of assimilation. Integration does not assume that the habits learned and deployed at work and in other integrated settings must replace those prevailing in other settings. Racial equality therefore requires that blacks change, in that they acquire social and cultural capital that can be obtained only through social integration.

When blacks self-segregate, whites are of necessity racially isolated. Tatum imagines a world in which all-white groups construct positive, antiracist white identities for themselves, without burdening blacks with the thankless and stressful task of helping them deal with their prejudices.²⁰ Whites need to be aware of their own racial privilege for this to happen. Tatum and Young acknowledge that it is hard for whites to become aware of this if they are isolated from blacks. Even after acquiring such awareness, all-white groups are an inadequate setting for whites to learn how to advance racial equality. This is not just because when whites talk about race among themselves, what comes out may be, as in focus groups of working-class whites living in Detroit suburbs, “a profound distaste for blacks, a sentiment that pervades almost everything they think about government and politics. . . . Blacks constitute the explanation for their vulnerability and for almost everything that has gone wrong in their lives; not being black is what constitutes being middle class; not living with blacks is what makes a neighborhood a decent place to live.”²¹ This merely captures the problem of overt racists. The broader difficulty is that stigmatizing ideas operate unconsciously even among those who do not endorse them. To focus on changing whites’ beliefs about racial privilege or their quest for a nonracist self-understanding is to suppose that acquiring a politically correct consciousness is what whites need to be able to treat blacks as equals. Yet what most urgently needs to change are people’s unconscious habits of interracial interaction and perception. Such *practical* learning can take place only in integrated settings.

MacDonald imagines a world in which the critical epistemological communities are racially exclusive. Yet knowledge generated among blacks will have little impact if it does not inform the decisions of whites. It has little chance of doing that outside of integrated settings in which whites feel some accountability to fellow deliberators. Moreover, racial equality requires not just propositional knowledge, but practical knowledge of how to work together on terms of equality. Only racially integrated collective agents can generate this practical knowledge. Only by working and thinking *together* can *we* work out mutually respectful and cooperative habits of interaction.

MacDonald uses her epistemological argument to defend racial program housing in residential colleges. She rightly insists that blacks need to talk among themselves to develop strategies for coping with the stresses of integration. But she is wrong to suppose that the possibilities for generating this knowledge would be threatened by closing down racial program housing. Self-segregation is the default position of Americans of all races. Black students will find one another and develop coping strategies without segregated housing. MacDonald neglects the epistemological importance of the racially integrated “us.” This is the most scarce, important, and difficult community of meaning we need to construct. This community cannot be achieved if black students institutionalize their self-segregation in as pervasive a form as racial program housing.²² Classroom settings alone are not enough to make an integrated epistemic community.

MacDonald’s epistemological argument is questionable on its own terms, in focusing on the *preservation* of racially exclusive communities. There is no legitimate point in preserving the races, understood as social positions in a racialized social hierarchy. There may be a point in preserving cultural meanings and practices that are independent of racism. This is why MacDonald, like Young, tends to slide from a structural to a cultural account of race. Certainly, cultural meanings and practices that originated in black communities have immeasurably enriched American culture. But only a spurious association of culture with ancestry can support the thought that racial self-segregation is needed to preserve or develop diverse cultural meanings and practices. Whites and Asians can, and do, play jazz. No group “owns” any particular cultural practice or is entitled to exclusive development rights to it. In a free and democratic society, culture is part of the commons and is no racial group’s intellectual property. The demand to “preserve” particular cultural communities of meaning freezes culture in racialized cubicles, prevents its free engagement by others, and blocks its development by an integrated “us.”

The idea that institutionalized self-segregation is needed to preserve

epistemic diversity is equally spurious. It makes sense only against a background assumption that integration is the same as assimilation and cultural homogenization to a static mainstream culture. Yet integration is a constant generator of new cultural diversities and epistemic perspectives. Far from presuming that mainstream culture should remain static, integration aims to *change* it, especially to the extent that it embodies unconscious racial stereotypes and prejudices.

Integration insists on the centrality of forging a racially integrated “us” to advancing racial justice. Young, contrasting Kantian respect and communitarian solidarity, appears to deny this. Racial equality can be advanced on the basis of a “sense of commitment and justice owed to people, *but precisely not on the basis of a fellow feeling or mutual identification.*”²³ If she is merely saying that people can be induced to recognize obligations of justice to people for whom they have little affection, I agree. People do not need some *prior* sense of fellow feeling or mutual identification to have reasons to include one another as equals in cooperative projects. But the kind of inclusion entailed by seeing one another as fellow citizens joined in a common project of living together democratically *constitutes* a form of mutual identification. Unless this identification is invested with fellow feeling, the commitments we recognize as having to one another as citizens are liable to be thin. It is time for the Left to put behind its preference for racial identities at the expense of national identities, as if racial identities were inherently more authentic and worthy of emotional investment. This neglects the impact on whites of prioritizing ethnoracial self-segregation. It reinforces whites’ alienation from disadvantaged groups, and their own tendencies to self-segregation. Given that it is impossible and undesirable to abolish informal routes to human and social capital development, and that whites control most of these routes, such a stance is self-defeating. Young’s condition on the moral permissibility of white self-segregation—that it not exclude others from opportunities—is not satisfied in our society, where whites control most of the gates to opportunity. Excessive promotion of black self-segregation cannot help but entail white clubbishness, and thereby defeat the cause of racial justice.

I conclude that the integrated “us,” not the self-segregated racial group, is the critical agent of racial justice that most urgently awaits deeper and richer construction. Neither justice nor democracy can be realized if the self-segregated racial group is celebrated as a more worthy site of identity and emotional investment than the integrated “us.” Identity politics, in the form of ethnoracial nationalism, was a necessary moment in the struggle for racial equality.²⁴ In particular, overcoming subordinating role segregation required for a time the development of spatially segregated domains where blacks could attain leadership positions. But it is time to

strike a new balance between moments of self-segregation and of integration, decidedly in favor of the racially inclusive “us.”

9.3 The Hope for an Integrated Future

Comprehensive racial integration is a necessary condition for a racially just future. It is needed to overcome unjust racial inequality in opportunities, undo racial stigmatization, and realize a fully democratic society of equal citizens. For these reasons, I have advocated various integrative policies in this book: housing vouchers to promote black entry into non-black middle-class neighborhoods (§6.2), abolition of class-segregative zoning regulations (§4.2), extension and aggressive enforcement of Title VII-style differential impact standards of illegal discrimination to state action (§8.5), abolition of legal obstacles to voluntary integration programs based on the supposed value of color blindness (chapter 8), assiduous adoption of integrative programs by school districts, including within K–12 schools (§6.3), drawing boundaries to create integrated voting districts (§6.4), selection for racially integrated juries (§6.4), and extension of discrimination-blocking and integrative affirmative action programs in employment, education, and contracting (§§7.4–7.5).

But is racial integration just a pipe dream? While implementation of these mostly state-centered policies would have important effects, at foreseeable scales their impact would be modest compared to the vast scale of de facto segregation. Truly large-scale state-centered attempts to racially integrate K–12 schools, as took place in the busing era, consistently encounter massive white resistance and are not politically feasible. Hence the project of integration cannot be left to state initiative alone. Most of the work of integration inevitably rests with the spontaneous actions of citizens in civil society. Here there are a few promising, if small, signs—for example, of churches seeking integrated congregations and promoting programs of racial reconciliation.²⁵ Yet the overall picture is gloomy. Spontaneous residential racial integration of blacks proceeds at a glacial pace. Voter initiatives and state legislatures are rolling back affirmative action by public universities, while the Supreme Court is restricting voluntary integration by K–12 schools. Federal enforcement of key civil rights initiatives—*Brown v. Board of Education* and its successor cases, the 1964 Civil Rights Act, and the Fair Housing Act—is little more than perfunctory. Opinion research suggests that this state of affairs is just how whites want it—except that they think they are not getting it since they believe government is doing *too much* to help blacks.

This raises the question of what sort of realism is demanded in political philosophy. Throughout this book, I have stressed the centrality of

nonideal theorizing in a sound political philosophy. Political philosophy should start with a diagnosis of what ails us, and construct remedies that are attentive to empirical constraints, including the limitations of human psychology. We are not nearly as rational, self-aware, and self-controlled as we imagine ourselves to be. Normative recommendations must take these limitations into account, lest they prescribe standards that are impossible for people to meet.

I have criticized both the multiculturalist Left and conservatives for their failure to live up to the demands of nonideal theorizing. Both sides fail to adequately diagnose the causes of racial inequality. They neglect the *multiple* ways de facto segregation propagates race-based injustice. Hence, they prescribe remedies—stricter race-neutral enforcement of antidiscrimination law, redistributing resources rather than people—that, in avoiding active steps toward integration, keep the fundamental causes of race-based injustice intact. Both sides also suggest psychologically unrealizable policies. Conservatives mistakenly suppose that people have the self-awareness and self-command to avoid acting on racially stigmatizing ideas that disadvantage blacks, simply by adopting a policy of color blindness. Multiculturalist advocates of race-based benign ethnocentrism mistakenly suppose that blacks can practice pervasive self-segregation under current conditions without reinforcing white social closure and self-flattering conceptions of white identity based on invidious comparisons with and alienation from blacks.

Is my integrationist theory unrealistic in these senses? No. It is based on an empirically grounded diagnosis of the causes of unjust race-based categorical inequality and pays close attention to the ability of integration to block or undo those causes and thereby reverse their effects (chapters 6, 7). It does not prescribe normative standards that are impossible or unreasonably difficult for people to meet, nor standards that fail to serve their objectives. Yet some theorists believe that a sound political philosophy must be realistic in another sense: that it must accommodate people's *unwillingness* to meet certain standards of justice. David Estlund argues that no one supposes that moral philosophy should be realistic in this sense: people's refusal to do what morality requires does not generate a valid claim on their part to be let off the moral hook. Why should matters be any different in normative political philosophy?²⁶

This does not mean that political philosophy should ignore what people are willing to do. It is one thing to lay out an objective required by justice, another to implement policies capable of achieving that objective. Policy design must be sensitive to the responses of people to those policies. Court-ordered busing of schoolchildren, if it causes white flight, may fail to integrate schools. Integrative policies may need to adjust their scale and timing, and be joined with incentives and public education, to win public acceptance.

Given the glacial progress of white-black integration in the United States, this may seem to be a counsel of despair. Yet opposition to integration is based more on anticipatory fear than on evidence. The whites who are most opposed to integration are those with the least experience of it. As we have seen, people who have experienced integration earlier in their lives tend to lead more integrated lives as adults. In a book otherwise devoted to demonstrating the poor prospects for neighborhood integration in the United States, William Julius Wilson and Richard Taub observed that younger generations, who had more interracial contact and no experience with the struggle over busing in the 1960s and 1970s, were less racist than older generations and joined in multiracial alliances to improve the schools.²⁷

As I was writing this book, the United States elected its first African American president. This does not portend an era of new policy initiatives aimed at overcoming race-based categorical inequality. President Obama was elected in part on an implicit promise not to make an issue of racial inequality, and nothing in his policy agenda suggests otherwise. Nevertheless, his election represents a moment of self-overcoming for democracy in America. In an act that was until very recently virtually inconceivable, a majority of Americans voting in 2008 chose to place their trust in a man who just fifty years ago would have been treated as unfit for collegial association with whites across the South, and in many domains outside the South. This gives us some reason to think that the horizon of realistic possibility for race relations in the United States extends beyond the low-altitude perspective of our current best estimates of feasibility. Notwithstanding the great obstacles to integration, we have grounds to hope for a better future.

55. 347 U.S. 495 (1954).
56. 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
57. *Ibid.*, 437–38 (rejecting “freedom of choice” plan for assigning students to schools).
58. *Ibid.*, 440, quoting *Bowman v. County School Board*, 382 F.2d 326, 333 (C.A.4th Cir.1967) (concurring opinion) (emphasis added).
59. 402 U.S. 1, 19, 28 (1971) (rejecting claim that the Constitution requires teachers to be assigned to schools on a “color-blind” basis, when de jure teacher assignments had enabled schools to be racially identified; rejecting “racially neutral” student assignments when they “fail to counteract the continuing effects of past school segregation”; and requiring race-conscious “affirmative action” to achieve desegregation).
60. 418 U.S. 717, 743–44 (1974).
61. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
62. 498 U.S. 237 (1991).
63. 503 U.S. 467 (1992).
64. 551 U.S. 701 (2007).
65. Muzafer Sherif et al., *Experimental Study of Positive and Negative Intergroup Attitudes between Experimentally Produced Groups: Robbers Cave Experiment* (Norman: Univ. of Oklahoma Press, 1954); Robyn Dawes, Alphonse van de Kragt, and John Orbell, “Cooperation for the Benefit of Us—Not Me, or My Conscience,” in *Beyond Self-Interest*, ed. Jane Mansbridge (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1990).
66. Young, *Inclusion and Democracy*.
67. Sherif et al., *Experimental Study of Positive and Negative Intergroup Attitudes*.
68. Hollinger, *Postethnic America*.

Chapter Nine

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1. Stanley Rothman, Seymour Martin Lipset, and Neil Nevitte, “Does Enrollment Diversity Improve University Education?” *International Journal of Public Opinion Research* 15.1 (2003): 8–26.
2. John Arthur, *Race, Equality, and the Burdens of History* (New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2007), 266–68; Peter Schuck, *Diversity in America: Keeping Government at a Safe Distance* (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press, 2003), 178–79.
3. Walter Allen, “The Color of Success: African-American College Student Outcomes at Predominantly White and Historically Black Public Colleges and Universities,” *Harvard Educational Review* 62.1 (1992): 39.
4. *Ibid.*, 37.
5. Ellis Cose, *The Rage of a Privileged Class* (New York: HarperCollins, 1993); Joe Feagin and Melvin Sikes, *Living with Racism: The Black Middle-Class Experience* (Boston: Beacon, 1994).
6. Pamela Jackson, Peggy Thoits, and Howard Taylor, “Composition of the Workplace and Psychological Well-Being: The Effects of Tokenism on America’s Black Elite,” *Social Forces* 74.2 (1995): 543–57.

7. Jeannine Bell, "Policing Neighborhood Boundaries: Violence, Racial Exclusion, and the Persistence of Segregation," Indiana Legal Studies Research Paper no. 74 (2007), <http://ssrn.com/abstract=963476>.

8. See Hanna Rosin, "American Murder Mystery," *The Atlantic* (July/Aug 2008): 40–54 (suggesting that recipients of section 8 housing vouchers designed to enable class [not racial] integration are causing a crime wave in Memphis, based on the overlap between areas of rising crime and addresses of section 8 recipients); Solomon Moore, "As Program Moves Poor to Suburbs, Tensions Follow," *New York Times*, Aug. 8, 2008: A1.

9. George Galster, "Consequences from the Redistribution of Urban Poverty during the 1990s: A Cautionary Tale," *Economic Development Quarterly* 19.2 (2005): 119–25.

10. Bowen and Bok, *Shape of the River*, 15.

11. Briggs and Dreier, "Memphis Murder Mystery?"

12. Patterson, *The Ordeal of Integration*.

13. Michael Norton et al., "Color Blindness and Interracial Interaction: Playing the Political Correctness Game," *Psychological Science* 17.11 (2006): 949–53.

14. Loury, *Anatomy of Racial Inequality*, 97.

15. Patterson, *The Ordeal of Integration*, 68.

16. Beverly Tatum, "Why Are All the Black Kids Sitting Together in the Cafeteria?" and *Other Conversations about Race* (New York: Basic Books, 1997), 54–74.

17. Young, *Inclusion and Democracy*, 217.

18. *Ibid.*, 216, 221, 227.

19. Aimee MacDonald, "Racial Authenticity and White Separatism: The Future of Racial Program Housing on College Campuses," in *Reclaiming Identity: Realist Theory and the Predicament of Postmodernism*, ed. Paula Moya and Michael Hames-Garcia (Berkeley and Los Angeles: Univ. of California Press, 2000), 213.

20. Tatum, "Why Are All the Black Kids Sitting Together in the Cafeteria?," 90–113.

21. Thomas Edsall and Mary Edsall, *Chain Reaction: The Impact of Race, Rights and Taxes on American Politics* (New York: Norton, 1991), 182.

22. I leave open the possibility that student housing based on themes of racial identity, but managed for racial integration (where blacks, say, might be a bare majority or plurality within the house, and a majority of blacks in student housing live elsewhere), would meet integrative goals. There is much to be said for the educative and democratic value of having many nonblacks participate in settings where blacks predominate.

23. Young, *Inclusion and Democracy*, 222–23.

24. Patterson, *The Ordeal of Integration*, 65–66.

25. Kathleen Garces-Foley, "New Opportunities and New Values: The Emergence of the Multicultural Church," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 612 (2007): 209–24.

26. David Estlund, *Democratic Authority: A Philosophical Framework* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 2008), 12–13.

27. Wilson and Taub, *There Goes the Neighborhood*, 27–31.