1. The Priority of Speaker Meaning and Speaker Reference

(i) Typically, speaker meaning has communicative priority over expression meaning. It is what speakers and hearers typically care about.

(ii) The speaker-based notions of meaning and reference are logically prior to the expression-based notions in the nexus of theoretical notions we need to explain facts about language and its use. (There can be speaker reference without expression reference.)

(iii) It is unclear there is any theoretically significant notion of semantic content is needed in order to explain facts about natural language. Specifically

— Unclear we need an independent notion of expression reference (a notion of what an expression refers to, relative to a context), i.e. a notion of expression reference that does not devolve into an antecedently motivated notion of speaker reference (a notion of what a speaker refers to on a given occasion in uttering something).

— Unclear we need an independent notion of what a sentence says (or of the proposition it expresses), relative to a context) i.e. a notion of what is said that does not devolve into an antecedently motivated notion of what a speaker says by uttering that sentence on a given occasion.

— It is plausible that what a speaker says in uttering something, x, on a given occasion is determined, in part, by what the speaker is referring to in uttering x and not by independent notion of expression reference.

A collapse (whether the relations are ternary or quaternary)?

(SR) \( S \) is using \( d \) to refer to \( \alpha \)

(ER) As it is being used by \( S \), \( d \) refers to \( \alpha \)

(SR’) \( S \) is using such-and-such occurrence of \( d \) in \( x \) to refer to \( \alpha \)

(ER’) As it is being used by \( S \), such-and-such occurrence of \( d \) in \( x \) refers to \( \alpha \).

2. Objections

[a complaint I hear is that] if we make what a speaker says directly dependent upon what the speaker is referring to—rather than on what the referring expressions he is using refer to—we are effectively (a) prevented from talking sensibly about both the (purported) rigidity and the (purportedly) directly referential nature of (e.g.) proper names and demonstratives, (b) prevented from drawing upon the fertile idea that reference is determined causally, and (c) facing immediate and certain disaster because referring (or speaker’s reference as it is often called) is a thoroughly intentional notion that is undermined by an array of cases involving perceptual, epistemic, or linguistic error, or just plain ignorance, on the speaker’s part. (Neale, 2008: 384)

the semantic attributes of expressions are not conceptually derivative of the speech acts performed by their utterers,…[they] are intrinsic to the expressions themselves, or to the expressions as expressions of a particular language (and as occurring in a particular context)…. expressions are symbols, and that, as such, they have a semantic life of their own…. [This] is the received conception of semantics in the tradition of Frege and Russell. (Salmon, 2005: 324).
3. **Rigidity**

(I) An occurrence of an expression \( d \) refers rigidly to \( a \) if and only if it refers to \( a \) with respect to every possible situation in which \( a \) exists (and to nothing distinct from \( a \) with respect to any possible situation in which \( a \) does not exist).

(I′) An occurrence of expression \( d \) refers rigidly to \( a \) if and only if \( d \) refers to \( a \) with respect to every possible situation (i.e. whether or not \( a \) exists in that situation).

4. **A Rôle for Speaker Reference?**

5. **Temporal Rigidity**

(II′) An occurrence of an expression refers t-rigidly to \( a \) if and only if it refers to \( a \) with respect to every past, present, or future situation (i.e. whether or not \( a \) exists in that situation)

6. **Term Limits: The Rigidity Thesis is Empirical (but “Virtually Conceptually Necessary”)**

(A) All natural language expressions that the machinery of a correct semantic theory treats as referring expressions are (modally and temporally) rigid de jure. (Neale, 1993)

If (A) is true, what might the reason be? The truth of (B) and (C):

(B) *De jure* rigidity reflects what we can sensibly call the (modal and temporal) rigidity of speaker reference, which is manifest even in acts of referring that do not involve the use of referring expressions;

(C) The rigidity of speaker reference is a reflex of what we can call the (modal and temporal) rigidity of belief and intention—indeed, all propositional attitudes—manifest in their “grip” on individual three-dimensional continuants in a dynamic and contingent world.

7. **[Rigidity in Extension]**

(IV) An occurrence of an expression is rigid in extension if and only if it has the same extension with respect to every possible situation.

(V) An occurrence of a definite description ‘the \( F \)’ is rigid\(_{e}\) (henceforth rigid\(_{e}\)) if and only if the predicate \( F \) is rigid\(_{e}\) and has exactly one thing in its extension.

8. **[De Jure Rigidity]**

(VII) An occurrence of a definite description ‘the \( F \)’ is rigid\(_{e}\) de facto if and only if the predicate \( F \) is rigid\(_{e}\) (and has exactly one thing in its extension).

(VIII) An occurrence of a designator is rigid\(_{e}\) de facto if and only if (1) it is rigid\(_{e}\), (2) it contains, as a proper part, a predicate \( F \) that is rigid\(_{e}\) (and has exactly one thing in its extension), and (3) its extension = the extension of \( F \).

(IX) An occurrence of a rigid designator is rigid\(_{e}\) de jure if its rigidity\(_{e}\) is not attributable to its having its extension determined by facts about the extensions of any of its proper parts.

(X) An occurrence of a rigid designator is rigid\(_{e}\) de jure if and only if it is semantically atomic.

9. **[The Direct Reference Explanation of Rigidity]**

10. **[Whence De Jure Rigidity]**
11. Rigidity and Truth Conditions

To speak of the ‘truth conditions’ of a sentence such as (1), it must be taken to express a single proposition—otherwise its truth conditions even with respect to the actual world are indeterminate. Thus ambiguous words or homonyms (perhaps ‘dog’ in (1)) must be read in a determinate way (canine!), indexicals must be assigned determinate references, syntactic ambiguities must be resolved, and it must be fixed whether ‘Aristotle’ names the philosopher or the shipping magnate. (Kripke, 1980: 9)

A proper understanding of this statement [i.e. of what is expressed by (1) relative to the aforementioned fixed reading/understanding] involves an understanding both of the (extensionally correct) conditions under which it [the statement] is in fact true, and of the conditions under which a counterfactual course of history, resembling the actual course in some respects but not in others, would be correctly (partially) described by [what is expressed by] (1) [on this fixed reading]. Presumably everyone agrees that there is a certain man—the philosopher we call ‘Aristotle’—such that, as a matter of fact, [what is expressed by] (1) [on this fixed reading] is true if and only if he was fond of dogs. The thesis of rigid designation is simply—subtle points aside [Footnote: In particular, we ignore the question of what to say about counterfactual situations in which Aristotle would not have existed…]—that the same paradigm applies to the truth conditions of [what is expressed by] (1) [on this fixed reading] as it describes counterfactual situations. That is, [what is expressed by] (1) [on this fixed reading] truly describes a counterfactual situation if and only if the same aforementioned man would have been fond of dogs, had that situation obtained. (Forget the counterfactual situations where he would not have existed.) (Kripke, 1980: 6)

…given this fixed understanding of (1), the question of rigidity is: Is the correctness of [what is expressed by] (1), thus understood, determined with respect to each counterfactual situation by whether a certain single person would have liked dogs (had that situation obtained)? I answer the question affirmatively. (Kripke, 1980: 9)

This question is entirely unaffected by the presence or absence in the language of other readings of (1). For each such particular reading separately, we can ask whether what is expressed [by (1), on that reading] would be true of a counterfactual situation if and only if some fixed individual has the appropriate property. This is the question of rigidity (Kripke, 1980: 9).

12. The “Rigidity” of Speaker Reference

[Transposition of Kripke] A proper understanding of what Ann said/meant in uttering (1) on that occasion involves an understanding both of the (extensionally correct) conditions under which it [what Ann said/meant] is in fact true, and of the conditions under which a counterfactual course of history, resembling the actual course of history in some respects but not in others, is correctly (partially) described by what she said/meant. There is a certain man—the ancient Greek philosopher we call ‘Aristotle’—such that, as a matter of fact, what Ann meant in uttering (1) on this occasion is true if and only if he was fond of dogs. The rigidity thesis I hold is simply—subtle points aside—that the same paradigm applies to the truth conditions of what Ann said/meant as it describes counterfactual situations. That is, what she said/meant correctly (but only partially) describes a counterfactual situation if and only if the same aforementioned man would have been fond of dogs, had that situation obtained.

…the question of rigidity is: Is the correctness of what Ann said/meant determined with respect to each counterfactual situation by whether a certain single person would have liked dogs (had that situation obtained)? I answer the question affirmatively.

(XI) In uttering $x$, a speaker $S$ refers to $\alpha$ if and only if the truth (relative to the actual or any counterfactual state of the world) of what $S$ means in uttering $x$ depends upon how things are with $\alpha$. 

3
(XII) In uttering \( x \), \( S \) means that \( p \) only if for some audience \( A \) and relation \( R \), \( S \) utters \( x \) intending it to be mutual knowledge between \( S \) and \( A \) that \( Rxp^* \) (where \( p^* \) is the proposition that \( p \)), and, at least partly on the basis of this, that \( S \)'s primary intention in uttering \( x \) is activating in \( A \) the belief that \( p \). (Schiffer) 

(XII') In uttering \( x \), \( S \) means that \( p \) only if for some audience \( A \) and property \( f \), \( S \) utters \( x \) intending \( A \) to recognize that \( x \) has \( f \) and, at least partly on the basis of this, recognize that \( S \) uttered \( x \) with the intention of activating in \( A \) the belief that \( p \). (Neale) 

13. Constraints on Intention Formation

Grice (1971: 264–6): There is something infelicitous about saying, “I intend to \( \phi \), but I might not \( \phi \)” and suggests this is explained if intentions involve beliefs in the following way: if \( S \) intends to \( \phi \), then \( S \) believes he will \( \phi \). (Interestingly, Grice rejected Davidson’s suggestion that the infelicity is better explained it terms of conversational implicature).

In general, one cannot do an act \( x \) with the intention of bringing about a certain result if one knows or believes that one will not thereby bring about that result. (Schiffer, 1972: 69)

The formation of genuine intentions is severely constrained by beliefs. I cannot intend to become a prime number, intend to digest my food through my lungs on alternate Tuesdays, or swim from New York to Sydney because (roughly) I cannot intend what I believe to be impossible . . . If, as Grice suggests, what \( S \) means by uttering \( x \) on a given occasion is determined by certain interpreter-directed intentions, then assuming \( S \) is being co-operative \( S \) cannot mean that \( p \) by uttering some sentence \( x \) if he believes it is impossible for his audience \( A \) (or at least any rational, reasonably well-informed interpreter in \( A \)'s shoes) to construe him as meaning that \( p \) (Neale 2004: 77; 2005: 181).

We are within the realm of actions for which what \( S \) is doing is a matter of what \( S \) intends someone else to think \( S \) is doing. It is in the nature of a communicative intention that what \( S \) means by uttering \( x \) is a matter of what \( S \) intends \( A \) to think \( S \) means by uttering \( x \). (And given the relation between speaker meaning and speaker reference, what \( S \) is referring to is a matter of what \( S \) intends \( A \) to think \( S \) is referring to, in uttering \( x \).) (Neale 2010: 54)

14. The Rigidity of Indexical Reference

15. Implicit Reference

(4) It’s hotter today than it is in Delhi.

(XIII) In uttering \( x \), \( S \) is using \( d \) to refer to \( a \) (and hence referring explicitly to \( a \)) if and only if

(1) \( d \) is an occurrence of a referring expression in \( x \),

(2) (Schiffer) there is some relation \( R \) such that \( S \) intends audience \( A \) to recognize that \( S \) assumes it is mutual knowledge between \( S \) and \( A \) that \( Rda \) and, at least partly on the basis of this, recognize that, in uttering \( x \), \( S \) is referring to \( a \).

(2') (Neale) there is some relation \( R \) such that \( S \) intends audience \( A \) to recognize that \( Rda \) and, at least partly on the basis of this, recognize that, in uttering \( x \), \( S \) is referring to \( a \).

(XIV) If \( d \) is an occurrence of a referring expression in \( x \), then \( d \) refers to \( a \) relative to \( S \)'s utterance of \( x \) if and only if in uttering \( x \), \( S \) is using \( d \) to refer to \( a \).

(XV) In uttering \( x \), \( S \) refers to \( a \) implicitly if and only if \( S \) is referring to \( a \) but there is no occurrence of any referring expression in \( x \) that \( S \) is using to refer to \( a \).

(4') Someone in London said that it’s hotter today than it is in Delhi.
16. The Metaphysics of Sentences, Utterances, and Inscriptions

An utterance is an act, hence a particular type of material event occurring in space and time, an event consisting in someone uttering something. A sentence, by contrast, is an abstract entity of which there can be many distinct utterances (or utterings). The parts of sentences and utterances are quite different. The parts (usually called constituents) of sentences are further abstract objects—words, phrases and (in attitude reports, for example) other sentences. But utterances are events, and their parts are further events. (Objects, by contrast, can only be participants in events.)

Being particular material events, utterances are very different from inscriptions, which are particular material objects. (Neale 2010: 40)

…objects are conceptualized in our experience as occupying space but not time, and as existing whole through time. An event does not persist in the way a continuant does—that is through time, gaining and losing new parts. A continuant has spatial parts, and to find the whole continuant you have only to explore its boundary at a time. An event has temporal parts, and to find the whole event you must trace it through its historical beginning to its historical end. An event does not have spatial parts in any way that is to be compared with (or understood by reference to) its relation to its temporal parts. Material object and event are in some sense duals (Wiggins, 1980: 25-26).

These differences between a material event and a material object should lead us to question the idea that an uttering and an inscription of a single sentence x are on a theoretical par, the idea that they are both “tokens” of “type” x (sentence-tokens as they are often called). Unless talk of types is just shorthand for talk of properties, then talk about types and tokens is a vacuous dodge unless accompanied by some sort of story about the relation between types and their tokens, without a stance, for example, on whether a token of a given type is individuated in terms of that type, or on whether a token’s being a token of a given type is an essential property of the token. And the idea of lumping utterings and inscriptions together as tokens of a common type seems to involve a category mistake. If an uttering is a token of anything, it’s a token of an uttering-type. If an inscription is a token of anything, it’s a token of an inscription-type. It would be good to know the facts in virtue of which an uttering-type and an inscription-type involve the same sentence. (Neale 2010: 42)

- An uttering represents an uttering-type
- An inscription represents an inscription-type
- An inscription-type represents an uttering-type.

In virtue of what facts does inscription-type z represent uttering type y? It is here that we need to appeal to spatial and temporal sequencing. An utterance of utterance-type y is a linear temporal sequencing of events. An inscription of inscription-type z is linear spatial sequencing of objects. In a (roughly) phoneme-based system of inscription, the linear spatial sequencing of these objects tracks, maps, or corresponds to the linear temporal sequencing of events in an utterance. (For example, orthographic segmentation is an approximate map of phonemic segmentation. (Neale 2010: 51)

An utterance is an utterance of sentence x not solely in virtue of (1) facts about its acoustic properties, but partly in virtue of (2) the fact that its articulatory properties are the result of the mechanics of implementing an intention to be producing something whose auditory properties are to form the evidential platform for ascertaining the content of the communicative intentions with which that very utterance was produced. We are within the realm of actions for which what S is doing is a matter of what S intends someone else to think S is doing. It is in the nature of a communicative intention that what S means by uttering x is a matter of what S intends A to think S means by uttering x. (And given the relation between speaker meaning and speaker reference, what S is referring to is a matter of what S intends A to think S is referring to, in uttering x.) In the typical speech situation, establishing what S means requires A to recognize which sentence S uttered. And which sentence S uttered is a matter of which sentence S intended A to think S was uttering. For we are still within the realm of actions for which what S is doing is a matter of what S intends someone else, A, to think S is doing. (Neale 2010: 54-55)
17. Implicit and Aphonytic Reference

(XV) In uttering \( x \), a speaker \( S \) is referring to \( a \) implicitly if and only if \( S \) is referring to \( a \) but no constituent of \( x \) is an occurrence of a referring expression that \( S \) is using to refer to \( a \).

(XV") In uttering \( x \), a speaker \( S \) is referring to \( a \) implicitly if and only if \( S \) is referring to \( a \) but no part of \( S \)'s utterance of \( x \) is the utterance of a referring expression \( S \) is using to refer to \( a \).

18. The Rigidity of Implicit Reference

(4) Today, it’s warmer than it is in Delhi.

[Transposition of Kripke] A proper understanding of what Ann said/meant in uttering (4) on this occasion involves an understanding both of the (extensionally correct) conditions under which it [what Ann said/meant] is in fact true, and of the conditions under which a counterfactual course of history, resembling the actual course of history in some respects but not in others, is correctly (partially) described by what Ann said/meant. There is a certain place \( x \)—viz. the British city we call ‘London’—and a certain place \( y \)—viz. the Indian city we call ‘Delhi’—such that, as a matter of fact, what Ann meant in uttering (4) on this occasion is true if and only if today, it’s warmer in \( x \) than it is in \( y \). The rigidity thesis I hold is simply—subtle points aside—that the same paradigm applies to the truth conditions of what Ann said/meant as it describes counterfactual situations. That is, what Ann said/meant correctly (but only partially) describes a counterfactual situation if and only if today it would have been warmer in \( x \) than it would have been in \( y \) had that situation obtained.

(5) The mayor can close the schools when it snowing.

[Transposition of Kripke] A proper understanding of what Ann said/meant in uttering (5) on this occasion involves an understanding both of the (extensionally correct) conditions under which it is in fact true, and of the conditions under which a counterfactual course of history, resembling the actual course of history in some respects but not in others, is correctly (partially) described by what Ann said/meant. There is a certain place—viz. the French city we call ‘Paris’—such that, as a matter of fact, what Ann said/meant in uttering (5) on this occasion is true if and only if the mayor of that city can close the schools in that city when it is snowing in that city. The rigidity thesis I hold is simply—subtle points aside—that the same paradigm applies to the truth conditions of what Ann said/meant as it describes counterfactual situations. That is, what Ann said/meant correctly (but only partially) describes a counterfactual situation if and only if the mayor of the same aforementioned city, would have been able to close the schools in that city were it snowing in that city, had the aforementioned counterfactual situation obtained.

19. The Rigidity of Aphonytic Reference

(4") Today, it’s warmer [\( e \)] than it is in Delhi

(5") The mayor [\( e \)] can close the schools [\( e \)] when it’s snowing [\( e \)].

(6) Ann wants/expects/intends [Sam to retire soon]

(8) Ann\(^1\) expects/intends/wants [\([e]\)\(_1\) to retire soon]

(9) Ann\(^1\) promised Sam [\([e]\)\(_1\) to retire soon]

(19) Ann\(^1\) used ‘he’ [\([e]\)\(_1\) to refer to Sam]

(11) Ann\(^1\) remembers (contemplates/fantasizes about) [\([e]\)\(_1\) retiring]

(12) Ann asked (told/ordered/persuaded/allowed) Sam\(^2\) [\([e]\)\(_2\) to retire soon].

(13) Ann saw/heard Sam\(^2\) [\([e]\)\(_2\) leave].

20. Metaphysics and the Rigidity of Thought