- This event has passed.
Colloquium: Santiago Echeverri (NYU), “First-Person Reference and Functional Role”
November 21 @ 4:15 pm - 6:15 pm
Each colloquium will be held on Wednesday from 4:15 P.M. to 6:15 P.M.
All colloquia will take place at the GC in rooms 9-204/9-205 except as otherwise noted.
Santiago Echeverri (NYU)
“First-Person Reference and Functional Role”
Abstract. What fixes the reference of the I-concept? Referential Accounts (RAs) hold that the reference of I is fixed by a reflexive rule. These accounts have the merit of being simple and extensionally adequate. Unfortunately, a number of writers think that the reflexive rule mischaracterizes the cognitive role of the I-concept. By contrast, Conceptual Role Accounts (CRAs) elucidate the content of the I-concept by establishing constitutive relations between I-thoughts and input and/or output conditions. Alas, these views have their own problems too: they seem to make the I-concept redundant in our cognitive economy, they make it hard to understand how two subjects can share the same type of I-concept, and they seem to connect the ability to self-refer too tightly with a working sensory apparatus. I present and defend the Integration Account (IA) of the I-concept. On this view, the I-concept is a device of information integration. Tokens of I conform to the reflexive rule because, only on that assumption, we can successfully engage in activities that require the inferential integration of self-concerning information. IA solves the main problems of RAs and CRAs and it has fruitful consequences for the debate on the essential indexical