Cognitive Approaches to Propositions at NYU June 13

Cognitive Approaches to Propositions at NYU June 13

‘Cognitive Approaches to Propositions or their Replacements’

Friday, June 13, 2014

NYU, Department of Philosophy
2nd floor

Workshop descriptions

The notion of an abstract proposition (a set of circumstances or a structured proposition) plays a central role in standard approaches to propositional attitudes and the semantics of attitude reports.
However, the notion raises an important issue of cognitive accessibility and has come under increasing attack. This workshop explores alternative, cognitive approaches to propositions or to what should instead play their role, taking into account both linguistic and cognitive issues.

10.00 – 11.30: Michael Devitt (CUNY): ‘Why Propositions?’
11.30 – 11.45: Coffee break
11.45 – 13.15: Friederike Moltmann (CNRS): ‘Cognitive Products and Context Dependence’

13.15 – 14.30: Lunch break

14.30 – 15.15: Robert Matthews (Rutgers): ‘A Role for Propositions in an Empirical Account of the Attitudes?’
15.15 _ 15.30: Coffee break
15.30 – 17.00: Berit Brogaard (Miami): ‘Cognitive Propositions and Perception’
17.00 – 18.30: Gary Ostertag (CUNY/Nassau): ‘Propositions as Performances’