CFP: Paraconsistent Reasoning in Science & Mathematics | Due 2/15

CFP: Paraconsistent Reasoning in Science & Mathematics | Due 2/15

Submission deadline: Saturday, February 15 2014 EST

Conference date(s):
Wednesday, June 11 2014 CET – Friday, June 13 2014 CET

Go to the conference’s page

Conference Venue:

Carl Friedrich von Siemens Stiftung
Munich, Germany



Graham Priest, City University of New York, USA and University of St
Andrews, UK
Diderik Batens, Ghent University, Belgium
Otavio Bueno, University of Miami, USA
Heinrich Wansing, Ruhr-Universität Bochum, Germany
Joke Meheus, Ghent University, Belgium
Francesco Berto, University of Amsterdam, The Netherlands
Andreas Kapsner, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität Munich, Germany

Extended with (on condition of extra funding):

Jc Beall, University of Connecticut, USA
Bryson Brown, University of Lethbridge, Canada
Itala M. Loffredo D’Ottaviano, University of Campinas, Brazil
Christian Straßer, Ghent University, Belgium


Paraconsistent logics restrict the inferential power of logics that
trivialize inconsistent sets, such as Classical Logic. A large number of
different paraconsistent logics have been developed in the previous and
present century. They attempt to formalize reasoning from inconsistent
premises, with the intent to explain how theories may be inconsistent, and
yet meaningful and useful. Such non-trivial inconsistent theories definitely
exist: this is abundantly shown in the history of science. There are
moreover prototypical non-empirical cases among which naive set theory and
naive truth theories are the most prominent ones.

The great variety of paraconsistent logics gives rise to various,
interrelated questions:
(a) What are the desiderata a paraconsistent logic should satisfy?
(b) Which paraconsistent logics score well given certain desiderata?
(c) Is there prospect of a universal approach to paraconsistent reasoning
with axiomatic theories?
(d) Comparison of paraconsistent approaches in terms of inferential power.
(e) To what extent is reasoning about sets structurally analogous to
reasoning about truth?
(f) To what extent is reasoning about sets structurally analogous to
reasoning with inconsistent axiomatic theories in the natural sciences?
(g) Is paraconsistent logic a normative or descriptive discipline, or
intermediate between these two options?
(h) Which inconsistent but non-trivial axiomatic theories are well
understood by which types of paraconsistent approaches?

This conference aims to address these questions from different perspectives
in order (i) to obtain a representative overview of the state of the art in
paraconsistent logics, (ii) to come up with fresh ideas for the future of
paraconsistency, and (iii) to facilitate debate and collaboration beyond the
borders of the different schools of paraconsistency.

Deadline for submission: February 15, 2014
Notification of acceptance: March 15, 2014
Conference: June 11-13, 2014


Please submit your abstract of approximately 500 words to:


Holger Andreas, LMU Munich, Germany
Peter Verdée, Ghent University, Belgium